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THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: POLICY NOTE
Sustained economic development depends
significantlyon the effectiveness and the efficiency
of a country's bureaucracy. The experience of
successful East Asian economies, e.g, South
Korea,, Malaysia nd Singapore, attests to this
(see Campos and Root 1996;World Bank 1993).
Critical to the performance of the bureaucracy
is a well functioning Public Service Commission
(PSC), for it is this institution that promotes and
safeguards the merit principle in the recruitment,
promotion, and career management of public
servants. Thus, it may be argued that the PSC
is the ultimate source of accountability for the
public bureaucracy and de facto acore institution
of accountability.
Per the Constitution of Bangladesh, the Public
Service Commission is responsible for a merit-
based recruitment process for the civil service as
well as for ensuring a fair, prompt and effective
disciplinary action system. However, in recent
years, the PSC's image has been seriously
tarnished because of its excessive politicization '
and corruption. Partisan appointments of its
Chair and Men{bers - perceived by the public
to be incompetent - have become a common
phenomena. Allegations ofexamination question
leakage and corrupt viva voce (candidate
interviews) practices have been rampant.
To begin restoring the functionality of the PSC,
the post- 1 1 January2007 caretakergovernment
appointed a new Chair and five new Members
to the current eight-member panel. Under the
new leadership, the PSC has initiated some
reforms, such as modernizing the examination
procedure and making the results available to
the candidates. To strengthen the PSC's reform
initiatives that, in turn, can drive a broader
reform process, the Institute of Governance
Studies (lGS)aims to provide a number of policy
recommendations with a view to strengthen
the PSC's reform initiatives.l This Policy Note
focuses on four issues:
lssue 1: Indeoendence: the extent to which
the PSC is autonomous from the Executive's
control
lssue 2: Accountability: he extent o which the
PSC can be held responsible for its decisions
and actions
lssue 3: Effectiveness: the extent o which the
PSC is achieving its objectives/mandates
lssue 4: Efficiency: the relative cost and implied
capacity with which the PSC carries out its
functions.
The recommendations are centered around
two broad issues: first, the appointment of the
Chair and the Members of the Commission;
and second, in-built mechanisms to ensure
that the PSC will be able to oerform its duties
within acceptable standards independent of the
level of commitment of the political leadership,
The policy recommendations are presented
in four sections: each section identifies key
problems, recommends ccjrresponding policy
changes and offers practical solutions to
implement the recommended policies. All policy
recommendations should be imolemented
1 IGS organized an international workshop 16-17 August
2OO7 to facilitate a deliberative process to formulate policy
recommendations. This Policy Note is based on the
workshop discussions, literature review and an empirical
study conducted in the preparation for the workshop.
by enacting a comprehensive nabling act
governing the PSC that would replace various
ordinances, rules and regulations that currently
govern the PSC. This legislation may be
prepared as an ordinance now and ratified by
the incoming Parliament after the elections,
Effective implementation of the policy
recommendations would ensure better
performance oflby the PSC and help the
bureaucracy in meeting the needs of the
counrry.
INDEPENDENCE
Dysfunctional Appointment Process of PSC
Chair and Members
Article 138 of the Constitution states that the
President appoints the PSC Chair and Memoers
and that half of the members must have held
the o{iice of the republic for more than twenty
years, The Constitution however does not
provide detailed criteria for the appointments,
nor does it specify any rules and regulations or
a process for the appointments to the PSC or
to any other constitutional or statutory offices.
Governments inthe past have taken advantage
of these omissions to appoint politically aligned
and not necessarily competent persons as Chair
and Members to establish a partisan control
over the civil service recruitment orocess.
To some extent, appointing persons of integrity.
to the PSC requires 'political will' of the party
in power. However, a system can be devised
to minimize opportunities for appointment
of partisan or incompetent persons to key
positions in the PSC. Similar mechanisms may
be incorporated in the process for all high-level
appointments to constitutional and statutory
oositions.
Clear ineligibility/disqualifying criteria should be
specified in the proposed act:
Afticle 138 of the Bangladesh Constitution
mentions very general eligibility criteria for
appointing Chair/Members. Based on practices
in other countries, the ineligibility criteria should
be introduced to avoid ambiguity in the selection
of candidates. The following persons hould be
barred from being appointed as Members and
Chair of the PSC:
r an elected or nominated Member of
Parliament (MP)
r a candidate for national or local elections
r a member of any political association
r a member of a trade union or any similar
body or association
r a person with a criminal record
These policy recommendations may be
included in the proposed act on the PSC.
Formation of a Search Committee:
A search committee appointed by the President
or the Parliament may select competent persons
to be appointed to constitutional bodies, including
the PSC, based on detailed criteria. Nominations
for the search committee should be free of
government's interference. Members of the search
committee should include i) MPs from ruling and
opposition parties, ii) university professors, iii) a
representative from the Bar Association, and iv)
representatives from the NGO community. After
the search committee proposes candidates for
constitutional posts, the President would make a
final appointment decision following an approval by
the Parliament (Article 61 of the rules of procedure
of the Parliament of Bangladesh allows the Prime
Minister to initiate a 'motion for adjournment
on a matter of public importance' to discuss
the appointments without any constitutional
amendment.) Moreover, to ensure transparency
and legitimacy ofthe process, the Parliament may
request a Special Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional Bodies to review the qualifications
of nominated members with the assistance of the
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC),
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Rank Differentials Among Commission
Members and the Secretariat
The present Warrant of Precedence ranks the
PSC Chair as an equivalent to a Secretary of
the government, while Members have a ranK
equivalent to an Additional Secretary. By a
way of contrast, the ACC Chair has a rank of
a Minister. The rank number of the pSC Chair
is also lower than that of the Comptroller
and Auditor General, In a status-oriented,
hierarchical bureaucracy, this lower status often
has tangible consequences with the pSC Chair
having insufficient authority to have his advice
accepted by the secretaries in line ministries.
Further, the PSC Secretariat's Secretary is
equivalent in status to that of the Commission
Members, and may be reluctant to work on the
advice of members.
The rank status of PSC Members and Chair
should be raised: the Chair should be equivalent
to, at least, that of a Cabinet Secreta'ry and
the Members equivalent to that of a Secretary.
Changing the rank status rn Warrant of
Precedence may be done by the Cabinet
Division of the government by issuing an
executive order.
Salary of the Chair and Members
The current salary scales at the pSC are
lower than the salary scales of the secretaries
and additional secretaries to whom the pSC
Chair and the Members are equivalent in rank.
However, there is a provision that if a salary
that a Member/Chair was getting from his/her
last job had.been higher than the consolidated
amount he/she will receive at the PSC, s/he will
continue to receive an amount equivalent to the
last drawn salary.
The pay scale of the PSC Chair and Members
should be revised and raised to be equal to the
salaries of public officials of the equivalent rank.
As it is proposed to raise the rank, the pSC Chair
should then receive a salary equal to one of
the Cabinet Secretary and the Members to the
Secretary. An amendment of 'The Members of
the Bangladesh Public Seruice Commission(Terms and Conditions) Act, 1974' (Act No.
XXI of 1974) is required to implement this
recommendation and it should be included
in the proposed act.
Weak Internal Governance of the PSC
Secretariat and a Dysfunctional Relationship
with the Ministry of Establishment (MoE)
The MoE helps the PSC in discharging its
duties. The MoE handles the deputation of
the PSC Secretariat staff and determines the
terms and conditions of service for the officers
on deputation, The PSC has no authority in
selecting officers to be posted on deputation.
This system creates a'dual governance' within
the PSC: first, by managing the officers on
deputation, MoE establishes its existence and
visibility within the PSC; and second, if too
rnany officers are posted on deputation, PSC's
reliance on the MoE gradually increases and the
MoE begins to controlthe PSC Secretariat.
In cases of posting on deputation, the PSC must
be able to choose its officers. For example, for
the choice of the Secretary the PSC Chair could
submit to the government a list of candidates
prepared in consultation with the Members.
. 
The government would be required to appoint
one person from the list within one month, Any
government official from a ministry/division with
rank equivalent to an Additional Secretary may be
selected as the PSC's Secretary. lmplementing
fhrb recommendation would require a
revision of the rules of business and also the
recruitment rules of the PSC. Ihese revisions
should be included in the proposed act.
Lack of Financial Autonomy of the PSC
The existing financial procedure demands that
the PSC formulates its own budget and submits
it to the Ministry of Finance (MoD. After reviewing
the budget, the MoF allocates the money to
the PSC. However, for disbursing approved
allocations and its dayto-day expenses, the
PSC requires constant interaction with the MoF,
which allows MoF to maintain a certain degree of
control over the PSC's budget. During the tenure
of several Chairs, all PSC communique with the
MoF had to be routed through the MoE, which
made the situation even more complex. The
PSC also does not have any control over its own
earnings as they go to the government treasury.
The financial autonomy of the PSC may be
ensured in a number of ways. One option is to
provide a 'charged account' for the PSC which
will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, Another
option is for the PSC to receive a lump budget
(similarto theACC budget) instead of a classified
budget. lt would allow the PSC's independence
from the MoF on any changes in the budget.
The third option is to provide the whole amount
to the PSC at once, after the MoF receives the
estimates and the budget is approved. Finally,
in addition to the regular revenue budget
allocation, the PSC should be allowed retain
complete control over its own earnings to
carry out research, provide its employees with
adequate training, etc. To ensure accountability,
the spending may be subjected to a review by
the Comptroller and Auditor General. These
recommendations would require inclusion in
the proposed act.
but was not, Current annual reports do not
provide any real mechanism for accountability
due to the dysfunction of the Parliament; the
reoorts are never discussed or debated in the
Parliament, The reporting process also has not
been approached seriously by PSC itself. The
qualityof reports has been poorand reportsfrom
successive years have suffered from repetition
of messages and issues.
A Special Parliamentary Committee should be
formed to reviewthe annual performance of the PSC
and other constitutional bodies, This can be done
by Parliamentin accordancewith Section 266 ot
Bules of Procedure without making any changes
in the rules of procedure of Parliament.
Lack of Accountability to the Citizenry
The essence of a democracy is the accountability
of government institutions to the citizens. So far,
the PSC is considered a 'restricted zone' for
citizens. Most citizens are not aware of what
and how well the services and functions are
performed bythe PSC. Access to both the PSC
itself and the information that the PSC holds is
difficult to obtain for an ordinarv citizen.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Weak Accountability to the Legislature
Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the PSC
is required to submit an annual report o the
President, who would then table the report
before the Parliament. The report should include
a description of activities undertaken during the
previous calendar year, a memorandum setting
out the cases where the Commission's advice
was not followed, and also the cases wnere
the Commission ought o have been consulted
The PSC should arrange a press conference to
launch the publication of its annual report and
the Chair should discuss major activities and
challenges faced by the PSC. A website should
include all necessary information about the PSC,
including its operations, upcoming activities, and
the annual reports. As is currently being developed
by a number of line departments, the PSC
should have a citizen's charter clearly describing
its duties and responsibilities to the public, The
physical access to the PSC could also be made
easier. For instance, a public information desk on
its premises, staffed by appropriately qualified
persons, could provide the public interface,
Ihese measures may be taken by the PSC
itself without changing any rules.
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Lack of Accountability to Exam Candidates
Until recently, there had been no mechanism in
placeto hold the PSC accountableto its primary
stakeholders, the candidates for civil servtcejobs, The examination marks and admission
criteria were not disclosed to the candidates,
The current PSC Chair's decision to start a
convention which would allow candidates of
the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) examination
to learn about their pedormance is a welcome
change. Other positive steps can be taken:
making the results of the BCS examination
available to candidates through a password
operated website, making the examination
scripts available and if requested reviewed
by the PSC in exchange for a fee. Ihe PSC
may implement fhese poilicies itself without
changing any acts oi rules.
EFFECTIVENESS
The pdncipd task of the PSC is to rggulate
public administration so that the government
agencies/ministries are able to meet their
respective mandates. The PSC's effectiveness
can be judged, to a large extent, bythe quality of
personnel in the civil service. With a competent,
honest, and hard working civil service, the
government will be better able to deliver public
goods and services.
Modernizing the BCS Examination System
One of the major duties of the PSC is to conduct
examinations for prospective candidates to '
select the future bureaucrats of the country.
This process has been the centre of criticism
for a long time. The questions et for the BCS
examination are not onlyconsideredto beof poor
quality but they also fail to test the skills required
of modern day civilservants. The contemporary
examination tools such as queStion banks,
random scrambling of questions on examination
papers, and computerized marking have never
been used. The BCS examination process is
also extremely lengthy - it takes more than two
years to complete one BCS examination cycle,
A set of proposals is presented below for the
complete overhaul of the existing examination
system:
lmproving the Conduct of the Examinations
r In place of the existing question setting
process, a question bank can be created.
For example, in the Philippines, the Civil
Service Commission requests 200 persons
from different fields to prepare at least 5,000
questions which are then divided into three
classes - easy, medium and difficult. A
computerized program selects a subset
of questions from each category for the
examination, Considering the brisk pace of
technological development in Bangladesh,
this can potentially be realized within the next
few years.
r To enable the exam process to be completed
within one year, the eligibility requirements
should be raised, e.g. educationalattainment
of at least two first class/division, and a
significant increase of the passing mark for
the general written examinations from the
current 45 percent benchmark,
r For the immediate term, outsourcing of the
BCS examination could be considered.
The PSC can set criteria for conduct of the
examinations and, following a transparent
bidding process, contract one or more
providers to carry out and manage the
examination process,
Better Tailoring of the Examinations
Since the 27th BCS examination i 2005, the
PSC has eliminated the choosing of optional
subjects and has introduced some uniformity
in the examinations. While these are positive
developments, everal other modifications to
bring even greater uniformity and more objectivity
in selecting the most competent candidates
might be considered:
r As the BCS examinations are conducted
to recruit first class gazetted officers, they
should be structured to assess candidates'
managerial skills more effectively. One option
is to introduce a new reouirement that
evaluates managerial skills through logical
reasoning such as reading of a case study
followed by a set of questions.
r Make academic performance a common/
uniform criterion for both the general and the
professional cadres, The current practice is
to apply this only to the latter.
Another major problem of the existing BCS
examination is that it does not take into
consideration the need for specialization of
different cadres. This frequently results in a
mismatch between the skills needed for a job
and the candidates elected, One way to solve
this problem is through the introduction of a
cadre-based examination system.
r Candidates should. clearly specify his/her
preferred cadres (maximum of three) in the
application form. Candidates who apply for
a cadre without having adequate ducational
specialization will have to sit for an additional
cad re-specif icexamination. The cadre-switch
examination option will not be applicable for
candidates to technical cadres which require
specialized academic backgrounds (medical
doctors, engineers etc.).
To implement many of the above policies,
the Bangladesh Civil Seruice Recruitmept
Rules, 1981 and the Bangladesh Civil
Service Recruitment (Age, Qualification and
Examination for Direct Recruitment) Rules,
1982 will need to be amended.
lnterview Board
The BCS examination includes a viva voce(interview component). The PSC forms multiple
viva boards that include PSC Chair/Members
as well as academics, civil servants, and other
qualified members of civil society and the
private sector. Prior to the reconstitution of the
PSC, these boards had been accused of being
a major source of corruption and humiliation/
harassment of the candidates.
An interview manual could be developed to
specify acceptable viva voce board behavior in
dealing with the candidates, types of questions
that can and cannot be asked, etc. For the
longer term, the PSC might consider having
a single viva board. With an increase of the
eligibility criteria and the passing mark for the
general exams, the number of candidates for
viva will significantly decrease so that a single
board will likely suffice.
Recruitment of Personnel into BCS throuoh the
Quota System
A faulty quota system has become a significant
obstacle in recruiting competent persons to the
civil seruice. According to the present policy,
only 45 percent of new BCS staff recruitment
is strictly merit-based while the majority joins
through a complex quota system. The system
includes pecial provisions for minorities, children
of freedom fighters, and district representation,
among others. Practically all research and
analyses of the civil service have recommended
a modification of the present system fflB 2007;
Khan 2005).
The Freedom Fighters children's quotashould be
abolished and a study conducted to determine
whether the quota system is still needed and, if
so. under what conditions.z
lrregularities in Disciplinary Matters
According to the Government Servants
(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1985, the PSC is to
be consulted before taking any major disciplinary
2 tr" pSC asked the World Bank to conduct an e)tensive
study of the quota system and to recommend changes.
To implement any changes to the policy, the Quota
Reservation Policy (1997) will have to be amended.
action against a government servant. However,
the rule does not specify the timeframe within
which the PSC has to send the concerneo
ministry its recommendations. This deficiencv
has opened avenues for corruption.
The rule should be amended to specify that
the PSC must send its recommendation to
the concerned ministryldivision within fifteen
days of receiving a disciplinary case.
EFFICIENCY
The efficiency ofthe PSC depends on the quality
of its own personnel. lf a more qualified and
competent staff is hired, the institution is better
able to perform its function,
Practice of Deputation within the PSC: from
Deputation to De-motivation
Whenever any official comes via deputation,
he/she reduces the chances of promotion of
the PSC's in-house mployees and thus affects
the motivation of in-house staff. However, it
is the lack of adequate skills and knowledge
among the in-house PSC employees (i.e,, the
Secretariat staf0 that drives the Commission
to seek deputation from other government
agencies.
Appropriate changes in the policy and process of
recruitment and promotion of the PSC staff are
necessary. These changes will facilitate bringing
competent personnel into the PSC Secretariat.
CONCLUSION
The present caretaker government has
demonstrated considerable commitment to
reforming the PSC and making it more effective.
However, the caretaker government should not
be expected to - indeed will not be able to - fix all
the problems of the Public Service Commission.
After an elected government comes to power,
it is conceivable that its commitment o PSC
reform may not be as strong. In this Policy Note,
certain structural changes within the PSC are
proposed to allow this institution to function
reasonably well even if commitment o reform of
next, or any subsequent, government is weak,
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